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Perception is a central means by which we come to rep-
resent and be aware of particulars in the world. I argue
that an adequate account of perceptionmust distinguish
between what one perceives and what one’s perceptual
experience is of or about. Through capacities for visual
completion, one can be visually aware of particular
parts of a scene that one nevertheless does not see.
Seeing corresponds to a basic, but not exhaustive, way
in which one can be visually aware of an item. I discuss
how the relation between seeing and visual awareness
should be explicated within a representational account
of the mind. Visual awareness of an item involves a
primitive kind of reference: one is visually aware of
an item when one’s visual perceptual state succeeds
in referring to that particular item and functions to
represent it accurately. Seeing, by contrast, requires
more than successful visual reference. Seeing depends
additionally on meta-semantic facts about how visual
reference happens to be fixed. The notions of seeing
and of visual reference are both indispensable to an
account of perception, but they are to be characterized
at different levels of representational explanation.
Perception is a central means by which we become aware of the surrounding world. In virtue
of my current visual state or experience, I am aware of the size, shape, and color of the desk in
front of me. Moreover, one does not simply experience a matrix of properties—sizes, shapes,
colors, and whatever else—which the particular objects of the world may or may not possess.
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What is variously called the particularity, singularity, or de re nature of perception consists in the
fact that one’s perceptual state or experience can be of particular items in a scene, such that it is
those specific items and no others that one experiences as having certain sizes, shapes, and so on.
My current visual experience is not simply of something or other but is rather of this very object.
Accordingly, how closely my experience matches the world or not—its degree of accuracy—
depends on how closely it matches this particular object. Let us say that one is perceptually aware
of an item if that item in fact exists and one’s perceptual state or experience is of, or about, that item
in particular. The capacity to be aware of particulars in the world is a vital cognitive achievement,
allowing one to represent an entity as that entity and not just as whatsoever satisfies a description.
It is widely recognized that accounts of the particularity of perception must accommodate the
following facts. First, an item can perceptually appear to have features that it does not have, as in
standard visual size, shape, and color illusions. Second, one can seem to experience an itemwhen
in fact no such item exists, as in certain hallucinations. In this paper, I argue that such accounts
must accommodate a further, less appreciated fact: one can be visually aware of particular parts
of a scene without seeing those parts. Theories of perception must therefore distinguish between
seeing a particular and being visually aware of it—more broadly, between perceiving a particu-
lar and being perceptually aware of it. After motivating this distinction, I will suggest that seeing
and visual awareness figure into distinct levels of explanation of our abilities to obtain perceptual
access to particulars in the world.
The phenomenon of perceptual completion provides the wedge that drives apart what one sees
from what one is visually aware of. The patterns of light that reach the eyes from any given thing
are almost always fragmented. Mountain ridges, telephone lines, and cars are partly occluded
by nearby trees, lampposts, and buildings. Yet one’s experience is not of a radically, arbitrarily
fragmentedworld. Humans and other animals have a suite of capacities for visual completion that
are employed formost things inmost scenes and that are foundational to our capacities to perceive
whole, integrated objects, rather than a mere mosaic of disconnected fragments (see Kellman,
2003; van Lier & Gerbino, 2015). These capacities allow one to visually experience, in addition to
the visible fragments of things, the unified wholes to which different fragments belong. In fact,
humans and many other animals are surprisingly accurate and precise not only in which visible
fragments we perceive as parts of the same object, but also in how we perceive those fragments
to be connected behind the occluding surfaces. More often than not, one is accurate when one
experiences a mountain ridge in the distance as continuing smoothly behind the lamppost in the
foreground, rather than peaking sharply or giving way to a valley that is exactly covered up by the
lamppost. In fact, I will suggest that in experiencing the mountain ridge as continuing smoothly
behind the lamppost, one can be visually aware not only of the whole mountain ridge and its
global shape, but also of the particular occluded fragments of the ridge and the local properties of
those fragments. One can be visually aware of occluded fragments, though one cannot see them.
Many deny that one can have genuine visual experiences of the occluded parts of things (see,
for example, Bermúdez, 2000). Others grant that one’s visual experience can be of these hidden
parts and draw the conclusion that one can seewhat is not visible (see, for example, Ganson, 2020;
Munton, 2021). I will take the middle way. One’s visual experience can be of the very part of the
mountain ridge that is occluded; yet there is a significant sense in which one cannot see that part
of the ridge. While terms such as “sees,” “experiences,” and “is aware of” all have a multiplicity of
usages, the distinction that emerges here between seeing an item and being visually aware of it has
real explanatory import. An adequate account of how we have perceptual access to particulars in
the world should distinguish these notions, while explicating how they are related. I focus here on
vision, though analogous capacities for completion exist in hearing and touch. While I will focus
here on perceptual states that can be consciously experienced, I do not assume that either one’s
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seeing a particular or one’s being visually aware of it, as I intend to use these expressions, must
be conscious.
The distinction between visual awareness and seeing has significant consequences for theories
of perception. For example, a core task for representational theories of the particularity of per-
ception is to explicate seeing and perceiving in terms of semantic notions such as accuracy and
reference. The account I will develop of the relation between seeing an item and being visually
aware of it builds on existing attempts to do this, although I will cast the notion of seeing in a
different explanatory role than these prior accounts. According to the accounts on which I draw,
the particularity of perception consists in the fact that perceptual states have (or function to have)
singular, de re accuracy conditions. Roughly: a full specification of the accuracy conditions of a
token perceptual experience must contain a place for indicating the particular items on which
the accuracy of that experience depends (see, for example, Burge, 2005, 2010). The contents of
perceptual experiences—the ways these experiences characterize the world—involve a primitive
form of reference. Given the context in whichmy experience is formed, that experience itself refers
to this object and attributes a certain shape to it. Notice that on this account, referential content
is not confined to the judgments that I form on the basis of a perceptual state or experience; the
perceptual state or experience itself bears referential content.
Such an account of the contents of perception iswell-suited to explicatingwhat it is for a percep-
tual experience to be of or about particular items (cf. Soteriou, 2000; Martin, 2002). One’s experi-
ence is of a particular—one is perceptually aware of that particular—just in case one’s experience
succeeds in referring to that particular in a given context and thereby functions to represent the
particular accurately. However, if some aspect of one’s visual experience can successfully refer to
a part of the scene that one does not see, then successful visual referencemust not be sufficient for
seeing. I will suggest that whereas to be visually aware of an item depends on successfully visually
referring to that item, whether one sees an item depends in addition on the specificmeta-semantic
grounds by which visual reference to the item is fixed. Seeing marks one way in which the ability
to visually refer can succeed. However, this specific way of fixing visual reference is not encoded
in the contents of perception. Seeing does not involve a special mode of visual reference.
In Sections 1–3, I motivate the distinction between being visually aware of an item and seeing
it. In Section 1, I argue that one can visually experience the shape, location, and other features of
occluded elements in a scene. In Section 2, I argue that in experiencing the features of an occluded
element, one can be visually aware of the particular element itself, de re. When visual comple-
tion of the mountain ridge is successful, one is not just aware of the ridge having some occluded
part, one is aware of that particular occluded part of the scene. In Section 3, I argue that there is
an explanatorily significant distinction between seeing an item, which one cannot do when the
item is occluded, and being visually aware of it. What one is visually aware of depends asymmet-
rically on what one sees. In Section 4, I explore the implications for understanding seeing and
visual awareness in terms of abilities to represent the world. Both notions are indispensable to
understanding how we perceptually represent particulars, but they belong to different levels of
representational explanation.1
1 Though my account of the relation between seeing and visual awareness is couched in a representational approach to
perception, the argument for a distinction between these notions does not depend essentially on such an approach. Any
account of perception should therefore accommodate this distinction. For example, relationalist views hold, roughly, that
perception is a relation constituted by a perceiver together with particular items in a scene (for example Campbell, 2002;
Martin, 2006; Brewer, 2011; Logue, 2012). Experiences that count as genuine perceptions (as opposed to hallucinations)
havemind-independent objects as constituents. Relationalist viewsmust explain the connection between the relation that
constitutes seeing (or perceiving) and the relation that constitutes visual (or perceptual) awareness.
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1 MINDING THE GAPS
Over the next three sections, I defend the following argument for distinguishing between seeing
an item and being visually aware, or having a visual experience, of that item:
(1) One can visually represent and experience occluded features in a scene, such as the local
shape of an occluded part of an object’s outline.
(2) In representing and experiencing occluded features, one can be visually aware (de re) of the
particular occluded parts of the scene to which those features belong.
(3) One cannot see parts of a scene that are occluded.
(4) Therefore, one can be visually aware (de re) of particular elements that one does not see.
Many deny the first premise in one form or other. For example, Bermúdez asserts that “the parts
of an object which are hidden on a given occasion make no contribution to the look of the object
on that occasion” (Bermúdez, 2000, p. 363), where the “the look of an object is what allows the
perceiver visually to discriminate that object from its surroundings” (Bermúdez, 2000, p. 364).
Against this I will argue, first, that at least at the sub-individual level, the visual system differenti-
ates and forms representations specifically about the features of hidden parts of the scene. These
representations partly determine how one discriminates whole objects. I will then argue that the
visual processing of occluded features corresponds to distinctive aspects of conscious experience.
There is something it is like to experience the size, shape, location, and so on of specific occluded
parts of a scene, and this constitutes part of what it is like to experience whole objects in the scene.
I will conclude by responding to potential objections that the experience of occluded features is
in some way non-perceptual.
My argument relies on our capacities for visual completion. Visual completion, broadly con-
strued, comprises three conceptually distinct types of capacity: capacities to psychologically rep-
resent and consciously experience the connectedness or unity of visible fragments of a scenewhen
those fragments do not project a continuous pattern of light to the eye (call this unitization);
capacities to represent and experience the local positions, shapes, colors, textures, and so on of
non-visible parts of an entity (call this interpolation or filling-in); and capacities to represent and
experience the complete, global shape, color, texture, and so on of a whole, partly occluded object
(completion proper). My argument appeals specifically to the interpolation of parts of a scene.
I focus in particular on the perceptual capacity to interpolate the occluded portions of the fac-
ing surface or boundary of an object (“amodal interpolation”), such as the bend in the black wire
depicted in Figure 1a. There are close parallels between this capacity and the capacity to interpo-
late the features of partially camouflaged objects (“modal interpolation”), such as the well-known
Kanizsa triangle or the curved figure in Fig. 7a below. It is widely, though not uncontroversially,
thought that commonmechanisms underlie these capacities (Kellman et al., 1998).While I believe
that the argument in this paper can be run with cases of modal interpolation, such an argument
would incur somewhat different burdens than the present argument based on amodal interpola-
tion. For example, while the interpolation of camouflaged parts has a much more striking phe-
nomenology than the interpolation of occluded parts, there is also a stronger tendency in the
philosophical and empirical literatures to characterize modal interpolation as always “illusory.”2
2 I leave it open what other cases illustrate the distinction between seeing and visual awareness, although it is worth
brieflymentioning two cases that are often associatedwith perceptual completion. First, when one sees an object gradually
disappear behind an occluder and re-appear on the other side, one tends to experience a single, continuously moving
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F IGURE 1 One’s visual experience and psychological processes respond to the partly occluded wire
depicted in (a) more like the way they respond to the wire in (c) than those in (b) and (d)
1.1 Visual processing
When you look at the picture in Fig. 1a, you are likely to experience the black lines as connecting
underneath the gray rectangle, where they form a bend approximately like the one you see in Fig.
1c. The effect would be especially pronounced if the visible black lines were moving up and down
in commonmotion (Kellman& Spelke, 1983) or if there were additional depth cues indicating that
the black lines are farther back than the gray surface (Nakayama et al., 1995). Of course, the black
lines are in fact disconnected paths of ink (or pixels) on a two-dimensional surface. But suppose
you were looking at a real-world scene that appears similar to Fig. 1a, containing a black wire,
the curved part of which is covered up by a notecard. In this scenario, you experience the wire as
continuing behind the occluder and as bending in a certain way. Suppose things are just as you
experience them: the wire does continue behind the occluder and does bend in just the way you
experience it as bending. Suppose, moreover, that prior to this encounter you have never seen the
occluded section of wire or any other part of the wire for that matter.3 The crucial claim now is
that visual processes can differentiate and accurately represent the local features of specific bits
of occluded wire, such as the curvature of the hidden kink in the wire.
We should be careful not to move too quickly from the fact that the visual system represents
features of the whole bent wire to the claim that the visual system represents features of occluded
parts of the wire. Unitization and global completion do not logically entail interpolation (see Pes-
soa et al., 1998). It could be that one’s visual system represents the global shape of the whole wire
object. This is sometimes called the “tunnel effect.” Munton (2021) argues that in such cases, one has a genuine visual
experience of an object at the moment that it has fully disappeared behind the occluder. She concludes that we see the
object even when it is fully occluded. I will argue in Section 3 that there must be a strict sense in which one cannot
see the occluded object. If Munton is right that one has a genuine visual experience of the object when it is occluded,
and if I am right that one nevertheless does not see the object in a strict sense, then the tunnel effect would provide an
additional case for my argument in this paper.Second, it is sometimes suggested that the experience of objects as having
three-dimensional volumetric shape (seeing something as cubical, for example) is a form of perceptual completion that
involves the interpolation of the object’s self-occluded backside (van Lier, 1999; Nanay, 2018). However, there has not
been enough experimental work to conclude, for example, that perceptually representing something as having a cubical
shape normally involves explicitly representing the back surface of the object as square. The strongest evidence that we
perceptually represent occluded parts of objects concerns the interpolation of facing surfaces and boundaries.
3 I will adopt this sort of pretense anytime I refer to how one experiences a diagram. I do not intend to describe experiences
of the diagrams themselves, but rather hypothetical experiences of scenes depicted by those diagrams.
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F IGURE 2 Stimuli like those used in Ringach and Shapley (1996): (a) a “thick” figure; (b) a “thin” figure; (c)
an interference condition
as bent, without specifically representing the occluded part itself as curved.4 Maybe local fea-
tures of the occluded part of the wire are only implied in the visual system’s representation of
the whole wire’s global shape. Against this possibility, I will cite behavioral, neurophysiological,
and computational considerations suggesting that local features of occluded parts are explicitly
represented in visual processing and play an important role in how the visual system represents
global properties of whole objects. In the next subsection, I will suggest that the visual processing
of these features can have correlates in conscious visual experience.
Let us start with behavioral studies of masking. Think of the black circles in Fig. 2 as portholes
through which you can see the corners of a partially hidden white figure. You should experience
a “thick” figure with left and right sides bowing outwards in Fig. 2a and a “thin” figure with sides
bowing inwards in Fig. 2b. In a classic study investigating the role of interpolation in the percep-
tion of partially occluded shapes, Ringach and Shapley (1996) tasked subjects with discriminat-
ing whether the partially occluded figure in such a stimulus was “thick” or “thin.” To determine
what role, if any, representations of occluded segments of the figures played in discriminating
the shapes of these figures, Ringach and Shapley superimposed over the stimuli straight line seg-
ments that overlapped the presumptively occluded sides of the figures, as illustrated in Fig. 2c.
They found that the added line segments “masked” or interfered with the discrimination of the
underlying figure’s shape. In short, subjects were slower, less accurate, and less precise in their
shape discriminations, even though the added lines did not actually distort any light coming from
the underlying shapes. A standard interpretation of this result is that the discrimination of the
global shape of the whole figure, as thick or thin, requires representing the occluded bound-
ary segments of the figure. The visual system does not simply jump from processing the visible
corners of the partially occluded figures to representing the whole figure’s global shape. Rather,
representing the global shape involves forming representations of the component segments of
the figure’s boundary—some of which are occluded. The masking effect arises because process-
ing representations of the visible straight lines interferes with processing representations of the
occluded curved boundary segments underneath, and thereby interferes with processing repre-
sentations of the whole shape.
Here is the logic supporting this interpretation. A common pattern in perception is that if
features of a stimulus receive similar kinds of perceptual representations, then the processing
of one such feature will likely mask or interfere with the processing of another—like competes
4 I use expressions in small caps as a rough and ready way to denote contents represented in visual processing.
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F IGURE 3 (a) Example of a “classification image” (adapted from Gold et al., 2000, p. 664, with permission
from Elsevier). The dark lines indicate locations in which pixel noise significantly correlates with the subject’s
discrimination of the underlying figure in a stimulus like that in (b) (this stimulus example was provided by
Richard Murray). (Pixel noise corresponding to the occluded top and bottom sides of the figure apparently did not
influence discrimination. This may be because the response categories of “thick”/“thin” biased subjects to base
their responses on the vertical sides.)
with like. For example, it is more difficult for the visual system to process a representation of a
line segment’s orientation when the system is also processing representations of other line seg-
ments with similar orientations at similar locations. By contrast, the processing of an item’s ori-
entation tends not to interfere with the processing of dissimilar orientations at dissimilar loca-
tions or with the processing of other perceptual dimensions such as color. Working backwards,
if one stimulus feature is discovered to mask another, this is evidence that these features receive
similar kinds of representations in the visual system. By investigating these patterns of interfer-
ence and non-interference, we can develop a precise picture of how the visual system codes fea-
tures like orientation, color, location, and shape. Turning back to Ringach and Shapley’s results,
they found that straight lines interfered with the discrimination of whole shapes. To explain this
interference, we must identify some represented feature of the stimulus that is comparable to,
and so competes with, the representations of the straight line segments. It is much more plau-
sible that the representation of a one-dimensional line segment as straight competes with
a representation of a one-dimensional line segment as curved than that it competes with a
global representation of a closed two-dimensional shape as thin. The natural explanation for
why the processing of straight lines interferes with the discrimination of the whole shape, then,
is that representing a shape as thin or thick involves representing occluded segments of the
shape’s boundary as curved in the appropriate ways, and that representations of visible line
segments as straight interfere with representations of nearby occluded boundary segments as
curved.
One concern with this study is that the visual system might treat the masking line segments
as forming a separate, global square pattern or “gestalt.” If that were the case, then the cost to
performance on the shape discrimination task might be due to competition between represen-
tations of different global shapes—thin versus square, say—rather than competition between
representations of different boundary segments as curved versus straight. Another concern
might be that the perceived orientations of the straight line segments interfere with the perceived
orientations of the visible corner segments.
To address concerns of this sort, Gold et al. (2000) presented thick and thin figures covered in
static white noise, as depicted in Fig. 3b. The masking features in this case—random fluctuations
in pixel luminance—did not give rise to a global shape percept that would compete with the per-
ception of the partially occluded figure or affect the perceived orientations of the corners. Gold
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F IGURE 4 Neuroimaging reveals common traces of neural responses when the wedge sweeps past the
occluders in the transparent and occluded conditions but not in the divided conditions. Adapted from Ban et al.
(2013) (CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0)
et al. correlated subjects’ performance on the shape discrimination task with the variations in
pixel noise across trials. Fig. 3a illustrates a “classification image,” in which the contrast between
the luminance of a pixel and the background indicates the strength and direction of the effect
that variations in luminance at that location had on shape discrimination. The error induced by
pixel noise was not distributed randomly across the image, but significantly corresponded to the
presumptively occluded parts of the figure. Consistent with the logic behind the interpretation
of Ringach and Shapley’s results, Gold et al.’s results suggest that the registration of pixel noise
interferes with representations of fragments of the figure’s occluded contour (see also Keane et al.,
2007). The discrimination of the global shape of a figure as thick or thin depends on represent-
ing small segments of the figure’s boundary, including occluded segments. When random noise
is introduced in the same area as those represented segments, the representation of the segments
is impaired and therefore the discrimination of the whole figure is affected.
Neurophysiological evidence corroborates the claim that the visual system specifically repre-
sents occluded, connecting fragments of things. Areas V1, V2, and V4 of the visual cortex, as well
as the lateral occipital complex (LOC), are all implicated in the representation of the shapes of
objects and parts of their bounding contours (Pasupathy et al., 2018). In all of these areas, neural
populations that are dedicated to representing segments of the visible bounding contours of objects
at specific locations have been demonstrated to show comparable activity even when no relevant
stimulation is received from that location, so long as there is evidence of occlusion. When a stim-
ulus feature is occluded, the visual system does not receive local stimulus cues that arise directly
from that stimulus feature. Neural activity that corresponds to occluded stimulus features instead
depends on contextual cues that arise from surrounding parts of the scene and which indicate the
occlusion of the stimulus feature in the relevant location.
To take just one example, Ban et al. (2013) conducted a neuroimaging study in which subjects
viewed a wedge-shaped figure continuously rotating about its thinnest point at a fixed speed, like
a hand on a clock-face, as illustrated in Fig. 4. In a “transparent” condition, translucent patches
were introduced at opposite locations in the display, each patch obscuring the mid-section of the
wedge whenever it swept underneath. In an “occluded” condition, these patches were made to be
fully opaque, so that at certain points as the figure rotated around the screen, one could see the top
and bottom of the object but not its mid-section. In a “divided” condition, there were no occlud-
ing patches and the mid-section of the figure was simply deleted so that the disconnected top and
bottom rotated around in common motion. Ban et al. identified specific retinotopic areas in V1
and V2 that responded to just the region of the visual field occupied by the occluding patches.
Using the transparent condition as a baseline, they identified evidence of periodic neural activ-
ity that occurred just when the wedge was sweeping underneath the translucent patches. They
found similar traces of periodic activity in these areas in the occluded condition but not in the
divided condition. In other words, neural activity was phase-locked to the presence of the wedge’s
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F IGURE 5 Examples of local, rather than global, completion. The visual system tends to process these
stimuli in accordance with local regularities of contours (that neighboring contour segments tend to be smooth
continuations) rather than regularities of global shapes (which tend to be symmetrical). Reproduced from
Carrigan et al. (2016) with permission from the American Psychological Association
mid-section underneath an occluder. The facts that the neural activity was similar to that in the
transparent condition andwas in phasewith the periods of timewhen part of the stimulus became
occluded suggests that this activity coded for the periodic presence of the occluded part of the stim-
ulus in the relevant area of the visual field. Since the neural activity was periodic, it is unlikely
that the activity was merely a response to the presence of the static occluding patches. And since
no such periodic activity was found in the divided condition, when there were no cues indicative
of occlusion, it is unlikely that these neurons were responding to just the visible top and bottom
of the wedge—indeed, early visual receptive fields are too small to register both the visible top
and bottom of the wedge. So, given the appropriate contextual cues it appears that neural activity
can encode the presence of a completely occluded fragment of the stimulus (see also Sugita, 1999;
Bakin et al., 2000; Murray et al., 2004; Thielen et al., 2019).
Finally, an adequate computational explanation of visual completionwill likely include compu-
tations that are defined over representations of occluded fragments. Inmany cases, the completed
boundary shape one experiences a partially occluded figure as having tends to be the one with the
smoothest curve, having the fewest inflections, that connects the visible fragments (Takeichi et al.,
1995; Fulvio et al., 2008; de Wit et al., 2008). The computation of smooth continuations involves
encoding the local properties of and relations between segments of an object’s boundary and very
likely relies on operations that take visible boundary segments as inputs and produce representa-
tions of hidden segments among their outputs (see, for example, Fantoni & Gerbino, 2003; Kalar
et al., 2010).
Irrespective of the exact form that a computational model of interpolation takes, it is plausible
that interpolation according to some principle of smooth continuation functions to yield repre-
sentations of the features of and relationships among segments of contour, both visible and hid-
den. Smooth continuation is defined over local segments of an object’s boundary, rather than an
object’s global shape. Computations that abide by some principle of smooth continuation provide
an optimal way of reliably representing object boundaries given the statistics of small boundary
segments. Far more often than not, adjacent segments on a bounding contour are smooth contin-
uations of each other (Geisler et al., 2001; Elder & Goldberg, 2002; Geisler & Perry, 2009). Smooth
continuation does not, however, reflect the global statistics of whole objects.Whole objects tend to
bemore symmetrical than the principle of smooth continuationwould sometimes suggest.Where
global symmetry demands a sharp corner, smooth continuation calls for a smooth, uneventful
curve. As Fig. 5 illustrates, completed shape experiences sometimes abide by smooth continua-
tion even at the expense of global symmetry. In following the principle of smooth continuation,
visual processing reflects and is well-explained by the statistics of contour segments rather than
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F IGURE 6 An illustration of “dot localization” stimuli, in which the task is to indicate whether the small
dot is on the inside or outside of the occluded boundary
the global statistics of whole shapes. It is plausible, therefore, that the visual states that result from
computations of smooth continuation function to encode or be about contour segments, both vis-
ible and occluded, and not merely global shape.
To be sure, we sometimes do experience partially occluded objects as having shapes that con-
flict with smooth continuation (van Lier & Gerbino, 2015; Yun et al., 2018). But there are psy-
chological differences between the types of cases in which one represents the whole shape of a
figure in accordance with global shape principles such as symmetry and the cases in which one
represents a shape by following a more fine-grained procedure of filling in the local positions,
curvatures, and so on of occluded fragments. More globally informed completion experiences
tend to arrive later in development (de Wit et al., 2008) and tend systematically to be less precise
than experiences based on smooth continuation. In the “dot localization” paradigm, developed in
Guttman and Kellman (2004), subjects are presented with a display depicting one surface partly
occluding another. A dot then appears over the occluder (as in Fig. 6) and the subject is asked
to indicate whether or not the dot is located to the left or right of the occluded segment of that
surface’s boundary. Subjects are able to accomplish this and similar tasks with great precision
when the visible fragments can be smoothly interpolated. Responses are significantly less precise
when they depend on global cues such as symmetry (Carrigan et al., 2016; Fulvio et al., 2008). The
greater precision and reliability of smooth continuationmakes ecological sense: the statistical reg-
ularity that contours tend to extend smoothly is far more robust and precise than the regularity
that objects are often somewhat symmetrical. The fact that interpolation by smooth continua-
tion has distinct psychological signatures than mere global completion bolsters the case that the
visual systemhas capacities to encode features of occluded fragments of things according to some-
thing like a principle of smooth continuation. These capacities facilitate, but are distinguishable
from, the encoding of global features of complete objects in accordance with principles such as
symmetry.
It is an open question how the visual system circumscribes the visible and occluded fragments
that it encodes—how it differentiates one piece of an object from another. The size, location, color,
and orientation of the fragment play a role. Differences in curvature likely also play a signifiant
role, so that the wire depicted in Fig. 1a may be represented in terms of two straight segments
and an occluded curved segment (Kellman et al., 2013). Irrespective of these details, the above
considerations together suggest that the shapes of partially occluded objects are often coded partly
in terms of the specific features of their occluded fragments.
1.2 Visual experience
The previous subsection argued that visual information-processing systems encode specific
occluded features, such as the curvature of the hidden part of the wire in Fig. 1a. What I now
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F IGURE 7 (a) Observers will typically “amodally” interpolate a curved contour that connects the white
segments (figure based on Kellman & Shipley, 1991, p. 179–180). (b) A Kanizsa triangle
want to argue is that the encoding of those hidden features can correspond to aspects of con-
scious visual experience. If hidden features can figure into conscious experience, this suggests
that these features are not merely the domain of sub-individual information-processing but can
enter into the whole individual’s awareness. To be sure, visual interpolation might not always
result in conscious experiences of hidden features. Moreover, I do not mean to suggest that an
individual can only be aware of something if she is consciously so. The claim here is just that
occluded features of things can (and often do) correspond to aspects of an individual’s conscious
experience and that therefore it is appropriate to say that the whole individual, and not merely
their visual sub-systems, can be aware of occluded features.
The perceptual interpolation of occluded elements is commonly said to be “amodal” and lack-
ing in phenomenal character, in contrast to the “phenomenal contours” that are said to arise
from the “modal” interpolation of partially camouflaged objects such as the Kanizsa triangle or
the curved white figure depicted in Fig. 7.5 The idea that amodal interpolation, in contrast to
modal interpolation, lacks any conscious character is somewhat puzzling. It is widely, though not
uncontroversially, thought that modal and amodal interpolation rely on common mechanisms.
Moreover, the evidence that the visual system encodes occluded features broadly replicates evi-
dence that the visual system encodes certain camouflaged features. Why, then, would interpo-
lated features be consciously experienced only in cases of partial camouflage? In what follows,
I will argue that there is no such disanalogy. Though amodal interpolation gives rise to a differ-
ent phenomenology thanmodal interpolation, it nevertheless does contribute to phenomenology:
occluded features can figure into the character of visual experiences.
We certainly do not experience hidden parts of a scene in the same way that we experience visi-
ble ones or modally interpolated ones. Nevertheless, hidden parts of the scene correspond to real,
distinctive features of visual phenomenology. One way to isolate which features of a scene are
consciously experienced is by investigating the phenomenal similarities and contrasts between
experiences (Siegel, 2010). Note that one’s experience of the partially occluded wire depicted in
(a) in Fig. 1 is similar in some respect to one’s experience of the fully visible, smoothly bent wire in
(c), but differs significantly from one’s experience of the fully visible crimped wire in (d) and from
one’s experience of the disconnected segments in (b). These similarities and differences would
be especially pronounced with the addition of depth cues and if the two lines were sliding up
and down in common motion behind the occluder. What is the best explanation for these pat-
terns of phenomenal similarity and contrast? Briscoe (2011, p. 156) writes, “the phenomenally
most salient characteristic of amodal completion is the perceived unity of the partially occluded
5 For criticism of this interpretation of the term “amodal” as it occurs in “amodal interpolation,” see Kellman, 2003;
Scherzer & Ekroll, 2015; Nanay, 2018.
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F IGURE 8 There is a local respect in which one’s experience of the partially occluded figure in (b) is more
similar to one’s experience of the black figure in (a) than to one’s experience of the black figure in (c), even
though the experiences of (b) and (c) are more similar on the whole
object.” But our phenomenology goes beyond unitization. There is a clear phenomenal contrast
between one’s experience of the occludedwire depicted in (a) and one’s experience of the crimped
wire depicted in (d). At the same time, one’s experience of the partially occluded wire does not
contrast as strongly with, and is even similar in important respects, to one’s experience of the
fully visible bent wire depicted in (c). These experiences do not differ, however, with respect to
whether one is experiencing a unified object. In (a), (c), and (d) alike, one experiences the vis-
ible parts of the wire as belonging to a unified whole. To explain why the experience of (a) is
similar to that of (c), but not (d), we must appeal to how one experiences the shapes of these
wires.
A possibility is that in experiencing the shape of a partially occluded object, one only experi-
ences the complete shape of the whole object and no distinctive part of one’s experience is specif-
ically dedicated to the shape of the occluded part. Even if there are visual processes that differen-
tiate the hidden curve from the visible straight lines, it may still be that in one’s phenomenology
these parts are “glued” together into a non-decomposable experience of the whole shape. But now
consider Fig. 8. One experiences the overall shapes of the wires as quite different from each other.
On the one hand, one’s experience of the partially occluded wire in (b) is more globally similar
to one’s experience of the fully visible wire in (c) than to that in (a). On the other hand, there is a
certain respect in which one’s experience of the wire in (b) is more similar to one’s experience of
the wire in (a) than to one’s experience of the one in (c). Namely, I suggest, one experiences the
central occluded part in (b) as curved in approximately the same way as the central bump in (a).
The phenomenal similarities and contrasts here have to do with one’s experience of the shape of
specific parts of the wire—their bumps and crimps. In the case of (b), the relevant part that one’s
experience characterizes is occluded. One’s experience of (b) is more similar to that of (a) than to
that of (c) with respect to the experienced curvature of the occluded part. One cannot plausibly
explain this aspect of the phenomenal similarity between (b) and (a) in terms of one’s experience
of the global shapes of the wires.
The visual system does not just encode the features of occluded segments of things; these fea-
tures can be presented in conscious visual experience.While there is reason to believe that hidden
features of objects can be represented unconsciously (Emmanouil & Ro, 2014)—they do not need
to be present in conscious experience—there is strong reason to believe that these hidden features
can be and regularly are experienced consciously. The way objects look to us can depend in part
on how we consciously experience certain occluded parts of those objects.
To say that occluded features of fragments of a scene have corresponding phenomenal character
is not to say that these features are as phenomenally salient or as ecologically important as whole
objects, say (see Siegel, 2006; Green, 2018; Matthen, 2019). We do not regularly “notice” occluded
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features of things or orient ourselves specifically to those features. These features tend to have little
intrinsic value to organisms outside of their value in supporting the reliable processing and expe-
riencing of whole, ecologically significant objects. For all that, the processing and experiencing of
whole objects does involve processing and consciously experiencing these fragmentary features.
It is worth emphasizing as well that in saying that one can visually experience the shape of an
occluded part of the scene, I am not denying that that this experience is significantly different in
kind from one’s experience of a visible part’s shape. Occluded parts of the scene do not look the
same as unoccluded ones. But it does not follow that one lacks any conscious experience of the
specific features of the occluded element or of its differentiation from the background. Nihilism
about the phenomenal character of amodal interpolation cannot explain relevant patterns of phe-
nomenal contrast and similarity. Even though they are experienced in different ways and perhaps
with different levels of detail, occluded features are just as much part of our visual experiences of
the world as their unoccluded counterparts.
Some hold that there is a phenomenology associated with occluded features of a scene while
still designating this phenomenology as distinctively “non-visual” or “non-sensory” in character.
I will presently argue that the phenomenology of occluded features is perceptual, as opposed to
cognitive or merely sensory. But some hold that perceptual completion is genuinely perceptual
in this sense, while still denying that these cases have a fully “visual phenomenology” (for exam-
ple, Smith, 2010; Briscoe, 2011). There is, I think, a good deal of difficulty in specifying just what
it means to have or lack a “visual” phenomenology in this sense, if this is to imply something
more than that experiences of occluded features do not have the same character as experiences of
their unoccluded counterparts. Still, what matters for the present argument is just that occluded
features do figure into an individual’s perceptual (not just cognitive, say) awareness of the
world.
1.3 Perceptual status
One possible objection is that the experience of occluded features is not part of perceptual experi-
ence. This reply can come from either of two directions. On the one hand, one might argue that
interpolation is a feature of early sensory processing, not of objective perceptual experience. On
the other hand, one might hold that the experience of occluded parts is entirely a product of post-
perceptual cognitive capacities. I do not intend to offer a general account of what distinguishes
perceptual from non-perceptual capacities. I will confine myself here to considering two archety-
pal arguments that interpolation is not perceptual.6
Burge (2010) notes that not all capacities for “extraction of form” from a patchy stimulus func-
tion to yield percepts of objective, distal features of the world. Low-level sensory processes might
6 Nanay (2010, 2018) argues that completed parts of the scene are represented throughmental imagery. He holds that com-
pletion does not give rise to a perception of the occluded parts of the scene for, he says, we do not have a causal connection
to those parts. At the same time, he holds that mental imagery consists in perceptual processing that occurs in the absence
of “corresponding stimulation” on the retina: “Perception is perceptual processing triggered by corresponding sensory
stimulation in the relevant sense modality. But perceptual processing does not have to be triggered by corresponding sen-
sory stimulation in the relevant sense modality—in the case of mental imagery, it is not” (Nanay, 2018, p. 7). Nanay’s
position is therefore consistent with the claim here that interpolation is perceptual, even if it does not constitute what he
calls perception, just as one might count an hallucinatory experience as perceptual without implying that it constitutes
perceiving. It is a further question, which I will not address here, whether this type of perceptual processing should in
addition be classified as mental imagery, as Nanay proposes.
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fill in missing information from a lossy registration of the retinal image by averaging and pooling
over registrations of proximal information or by comparing these registrations to stored patterns of
proximal stimuli. In such cases, Burge suggests, “[n]o objectification that distinguishes proximal
stimulation from objective environmental affairs need be in play” (Burge, 2010, p. 418). Insofar as
these processes do not operate according to principles that distinctively pertain to the nature of
specific distal features, they do not function to fill in hidden parts of the objective scene so much
as to fill in proximal information.
Burge’s concern here is to argue that the “extraction of forms” that are underspecified in the
retinal image is not sufficient for objective perception.However, he does not argue that all interpo-
lation is pre-perceptual. Indeed, the core processes of surface and contour interpolation that I have
been discussing are convincing examples of what Burge calls “objectification”: they constitute the
formation of states with representational contents that are “as of a subject matter beyond idiosyn-
cratic, proximal, or subjective features of the individual” (Burge, 2010, p. 397). Contour interpo-
lation processes operate on proximal cues, such as the presence of “T-junctions” in the retinal
image (Kellman & Shipley, 1991; Nakayama et al., 1995; Rubin, 2001). These cues are explanatorily
significant only in virtue of specific facts about features in the distal environment. For example,
T-junctions are significant because they often arise in images of partly occluded figures. In Fig. 1a,
for example, the visible black segments each project the “stem” of a T-junction while the sides of
the gray surface each project the “hat” of a T-junction. Kellman and Shipley (1991) argue that a
pair of visible fragments will be treated as a unit only when they project the stems of T-junctions
and when the visual system determines that the fragments are “relatable.” Roughly, visible frag-
ments of the wire are relatable if and only if straight-line extensions of the visible fragments would
intersect at an angle greater than or equal to 90◦. Suppose the visible segments of wire were each
extended in a straight line beyond the point of occlusion. These lines would intersect underneath
the gray surface at an angle greater than 90◦. Hence, the visible segments are relatable. Crucially,
relatability “reflect[s] important aspects of the physical world as it projects to the eyes.... Two vis-
ible edge segments associated with the same contour meet the mathematical relatability criterion
far more often than not” (Kellman et al., 2005, pp. 589–90). Mathematical relatability is a psycho-
logically significant cue in virtue of systematic facts about distal contours. General patterns among
distal contours not only enter into explaining when we interpolate, they enter into explanations
of how we interpolate. As I argued above, we tend to perceive relatable fragments as connected
by such “smooth continuations,” in accordance with the actual statistics of distal contours.
Indeed, smooth continuation operates on and yields representation of elements in depth (Kell-
man et al., 2005; Fantoni et al., 2008).Whenwe experience parts of an object as connecting behind
an occluder, what we experience is the smoothest connection as defined in three-dimensional
space, based on the visual system’s representation of the locations, orientations, and curvatures of
visible parts in depth. Boundary interpolation addresses the problem of how to fill in the hidden
parts of a distal scene on the basis of retinal stimuli that could have arisen from many different
distal configurations. Boundary interpolation solves this problem by capitalizing on regularities
in the optics of occlusion and the local structure inherent in distal objects. This form of inter-
polation is not merely a low-level, pre-perceptual image-processing capacity. It is a substantially
world-based and world-oriented capacity.
An objection from the other end is that the experience of occluded features is an aspect of post-
perceptual cognition. In Fig. 9a, one seems to experience a whole cat complete with legs and a
torso. But one’s experience surely depends on dispositions to recognize cats and on one’s back-
ground memories and beliefs about what they look like. Perhaps the phenomenology of occluded
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F IGURE 9 While the completion experience in (a) depends on recognitional dispositions and background
beliefs, these seem to be flaunted by one’s completion experience of (b). Adapted from Carrigan et al. (2016) with
permission from the American Psychological Association
parts of the cat is fully exhausted by the phenomenology of exercising these recognitional dispo-
sitions and beliefs.
Let us bracket the question of whether there is a “cognitive phenomenology” affiliated with
the exercise of recognitional dispositions and beliefs (Smithies, 2013). The objection faces the
problem that many cases of interpolation are insensitive to background beliefs and recognitional
dispositions. When looking at the scene depicted in Fig. 9b, one tends to experience the cat’s
head as attached to the bulbous shape underneath it and the tail as attached to the hook below,
even though this configuration does not facilitate the recognition of a familiar kind and is highly
improbable (grotesque even) in light of our background beliefs about cats (Kellman et al., 2005;
see also Nanay, 2010; Briscoe, 2011). Keane et al. (2012) found that often when cues to smooth
continuation are strong, explicit beliefs and intentions have little effect on the visual processing
of occluded parts (see also Keane, 2018). Indeed, the phenomenology of hidden parts is arguably
stronger andmore vivid for Fig. 9b than for Fig. 9a. Using the dot localization paradigm described
earlier, Carrigan et al. (2016) showed that hidden contours are localized much more precisely
when they are experienced as smoothly connecting visible parts at the expense of recognizability
than when they conform to recognizability though at the expense of smoothness. Smooth contin-
uation can guide interpolation even at the expense of recognizability and background expectation.
The sensitivity of amental state to cognitive states and background beliefs is sometimes taken to
be evidence that the state is itself a cognitive state. Background beliefs and recognitional disposi-
tions can influence one’s experiences of completed objects in certain cases. But these cases are not
exhaustive. In other cases, relevant background beliefs have little influence on perceptual comple-
tion. Some have gone so far as to suggest that recognition-based completion is simply a different
kind of capacity than interpolation—whatmight be called “recognition from partial information”
(Kellman, 2001), “cognitive completion” (Briscoe, 2011), or “contour abstraction” (Keane, 2018).
Perhaps an argument can be made from the belief-sensitivity of this latter kind of capacity to its
being post-perceptual. However, such an argument is a nonstarter for a core set of cases in which
interpolation is quite insensitive to recognitional dispositions and background beliefs.
2 DE RE AWARENESS OF HIDDEN PARTS
I have argued that one can visually represent and experience features of occluded parts of a scene.
In experiencing these features, is one visually aware de re of particular occluded parts of the scene,
such that one’s experience functions to be accurate of these specific parts and no others? Or does
one merely experience the scene or object as containing some occluded parts with such-and-such
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features? One central motivation for thinking that we cannot be aware de re of particular occluded
parts of a scene is that our experiences of occluded features seem not to have any causal relation-
ship to those features themselves. A highly plausible condition on being perceptually aware of a
particular item is that the item be causally related (I would add: in an explanatorily significant
way) to one’s experience of the item. For example, Strawson argued that a central condition on
being perceptually aware of a particular item is that the presence of that item partly “account for,”
or “be responsible for,” one’s perceptual experience of it (Strawson, 1979, p. 51; see also Grice, 1961;
Goldman, 1977; Sorensen, 2008; Burge, 2010). It is one’s causal relation to the item that allows one
to be aware of it in particular, even if the item does not uniquely possess all the properties that
one experiences it as having (Burge, 1977; Bach, 1987). But experiences of occluded parts are not
caused by the registration of light from those parts. This has led many to conclude that occluded
parts of a scene are “not causally responsible for any visual information” (Nanay, 2010, p. 242). In
the absence of some causal relation to the occluded part of the scene, it would seem that one can
only experience it in a general way as whatsoever has the properties one experiences.
I will argue that vision does exploit stimulus information about the presence and nature of
occluded fragments in the scene and that normally this information causally depends on those
fragments themselves. I should be clear that I do not intend to offer sufficient conditions on de
re awareness here. I focus on the existence of a causal-informational link to occluded parts of
the scene because such a link is widely held to be a necessary (if not sufficient) condition on de re
awareness of an item and because such a link is widely assumed not to exist when the experienced
features are occluded. The conditions on being a singular orde remental state are notoriously diffi-
cult to pin down (see the contributions to Jeshion, 2010). I only offer considerations of plausibility
and of parity with the ways in which one can be visually aware of visible things.
As I understand it, three conditions are implicit in the causal requirement on being visually
aware of an item. First, one’s being in a given visual state must causally depend in some explana-
torily relevant way on an event or state involving the item of which one is aware. Second, this
causal relationship must enable one to gain information about the item. The causal relationship
must be “epistemically rewarding,” as Recanati (2012) puts it. And third, the causally derived stim-
ulus information about the itemmust be operative, must play some systematic controlling role, in
the formation of one’s experience of that item (Evans, 1982). Each of these conditions is satisfied
in normal cases of interpolation. Visual interpolation functions to exploit certain stimulus cues
in virtue of the way those cues systematically causally depend on occluded parts of the world.
The first point, that there is an explanatory causal relationship between one’s filled-in experi-
ence and occluded parts of the scene, is the most controversial and is frequently dismissed out
of hand. Occluded parts of a scene do not reflect light to the eye. Instead, interpolation causally
depends on the registration of patterns in the light reflected by certain configurations of visible
parts of the scene. However, these configurations of visible parts of the scene normally depend, at
least in part, on the states of occluded parts of the scene.
Recall that standard stimulus cues for interpolation include the presence of “T-junctions” in the
retinal image, which indicate that one surface is occluding another. In interpolating the occluded
portion of an object’s boundary, the visual systemestimates the geometric relatability (as described
above) between the represented three-dimensional positions and orientations of the visible parts
of that boundary. Normally, the occluded contour is what binds the visible contours together into
a relatable configuration that in turn induces perceptual interpolation.
Suppose one is viewing the scene depicted in Fig. 1a, in which the wire continues behind the
gray surface. The pattern of light coming from the visible segments of the wire depends on how
those visible segments are arranged. In turn, how those visible segments are arranged depends on
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whether or how they are connected by the segment that happens to not be visible. If the occluded
segment had not existed, or had not connected the visible segments, or was curved in a different
way, or was located in a different place, it would be extraordinarily improbable that the visible
segments would be arranged just as they are and that they would abut the gray square without any
visible gap. The state of the occluded fragment—its existence, shape, position, and so on—plays
a role in determining the states of the of visible fragments. The visible fragments are arranged as
they are in part because of the presence and nature of the hidden connective fragments.
The causal dependence of the visible configuration of parts on the hidden connective tissue is
perhaps most vivid if one considers scenes from a more dynamic perspective. Do not think of the
partially occluded wire depicted in Fig. 1a as just pinned statically in place for all time. Rather,
suppose that the wire is where it is because it has been moved or dropped there at some point
in the past. The visible parts of the wire have moved through space and time to get to where
they are now. But the connecting segment—the segment that is now occluded—surely played
a role in keeping the visible segments in a regular arrangement throughout their travels. If that
segment were obliterated, the visible pieces would only have landed where they did by accident.
Or suppose the wire is moving up and down behind the occluder. The two visible segments move
in common motion because they are connected in a certain way behind the occluder. Perturbing
the path of one fragment has an effect on the path of the other by way of having an effect on
the path of the connecting fragment. A strong causal inference can therefore be made from the
common motion of visible parts to the presence and existence of a hidden connective structure.
The strength of such an inference likely corresponds to the fact that dynamic displays induce some
of the developmentally earliest and phenomenally most vivid experiences of occluded features.
Even in static cases, it is clear that the states of the occluded parts play a causal role in sustaining
the arrangement of visible parts at that moment. If the wire is being held up in the air at one of
its visible ends, the hidden connecting part helps explains why the other end takes the position
that it does on the other side of the occluder. Holding one end up causes the other end to stay
up, by way of causing the intervening connective tissue to stay up. When one views a partially
occluded telephone wire or bridge, the occluded parts that one cannot see play a causal role in the
configuration of the visible parts. Without those connecting parts, the visible parts of the wires
would drop to the ground; the bridge would collapse. In all these cases, the stimulus patterns that
drive interpolation arise from visible configurations that in turn depend causally on the hidden
connective tissue of the scene. So, in all these cases one’s experience of occluded features causally
depends in part on the presence and nature of occluded parts of the scene.
Crucially, unseen fragments of a scene causally sustain visible arrangements in ways that are
systematic and reliable. When visible segments of contour are relatable and participate in T-
junctions, it is often because there exist occluded segments that smoothly connect the visible ones.
Hence, stimulus patterns that arise from these arrangements of visible parts provide contextual
information about the presence and features of the occluded parts. The ways in which hidden
parts causally sustain visible configurations enable one to gain information about the presence
and features of those hidden parts. So, the second condition is fulfilled: the causal dependencies
of certain configurations, such as the presence of relatable edges that project to T-junctions, on
occluded parts of the scene enable the visual system to harvest information about those parts of
the scene. The causal relation between stimulus patterns and occluded parts of the scene is epis-
temically rewarding.
The third condition obtains as well: not only do there exist epistemically rewarding causal rela-
tions between features of the sensory stimulus and occluded parts of the scene, it is those very
relations that normally play an operative role in the experience one comes to have of occluded
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features. In interpolating hidden contours, visual processing relies on exactly the cues that nor-
mally systematically depend on hidden parts of a scene. Visual interpolation functions to encode
occluded features on the basis of cues that ultimately depend on the nature of occluded parts.
It should be uncontroversial that the contextual stimulus cues that play a controlling role in how
the visual system fills in the scene carry information about occluded parts of the scene. As Briscoe
points out, echoingGibson (1966), “the information available to the visual system for the existence
of an object-feature is not limited to the feature’s projection in the retinal image” (Briscoe, 2011,
p. 161). Interpolation processes exploit certain contextual cues because they are informative about
the features that are to be interpolated. But it is important also to appreciate that these cues are
informative about occluded parts of the scene because in normal circumstances those cues sys-
tematically causally depend on the parts of the scene about which they carry information. When
interpolation is successful, it is because it exploits cues that do in fact causally depend on the
hidden parts of the object whose features are being interpolated.7
I want to pause now to clarify these points in light of some potential reactions. First, I have
argued that the occluded parts of a scene can be part of the causal story that leads to one’s experi-
encing occluded features. But all sorts of other things will enter into that causal story too. There
is the person, say, who left the wire underneath the notecard. There is the factory that made the
wire according to a standard blueprint—a common cause of the entire wire’s shape. Not to men-
tion the photons reflecting off of the wire, to which one’s photoreceptors respond. And if we just
focus on what keeps the visible arrangement of the wire together, any of the visible connecting
bits are just as influential as the hidden ones in sustaining that arrangement. Not only do the parts
that happen to be hidden play a causal role in holding together the visible parts in some stable
relationship, the states of the visible parts can play a causal role in the position, shape, and move-
ment of the parts that are hidden. One might worry, then, that the causal influence of the hidden
fragments does not stand out enough, in some sense, to anchor one’s awareness to those frag-
ments. In response, it is worth emphasizing that the causal dependencies of visible arrangements
on the hidden connective tissue are systematic and reliable. Moreover, we have identified visual
processes that function specifically to exploit the systematic ways in which stimulus cues causally
depend on the occluded fragments in the scene. The causal influence of the hidden fragments on
contextual stimuli is psychologically significant: there are visual processes that are geared to com-
pute representations of occluded features precisely on the basis of the types of systematic effects
that those fragments have on the other parts of the scene.
This point bears on another potential response. Why carve up the relevant causal objects so
finely, into the visible and occluded parts of the object? A different way of telling the causal story
is that it is the state of the whole object, not the different fragments, that causally explains one’s
visual state in the relevant way. I think that this redescription is harmless, so long as we recognize
7 Ganson (2020) suggests that while contextual cues in the visual stimulus carry information about occluded parts of the
scene, they do not do so in virtue of causally depending on those parts. His aim is to relax the requirements of a causal
theory of perception: one’s experience need not causally depend on the object of perception so long as the experience is
causally correlated with that object, perhaps by way of some common cause. He focuses on cases of perceptual “extrap-
olation,” in which one experiences a partially occluded surface as extending behind an occluder without reappearing on
the other side. In these cases, “our visual system exploits cues in order to reveal occluded parts of objects. Our successful
perception of these occluded surface areas is not causally dependent on the parts seen” (Ganson, 2020, p. 690). (Context
makes clear that by “the parts seen” Gansonmeans the occluded parts that one experiences.) Ganson simply assumes that
there is no causal dependency between one’s experience and the occluded parts of the scene. While I have not discussed
perceptual extrapolation, I have argued that there normally is such a causal dependency in cases of perceptual interpola-
tion.
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that thewhole object has a causal role in inducing interpolation insofar as the object is constituted
by particular occluded parts that have certain features and stand in certain relations. What we
can say is that one’s experience of an occluded feature causally depends on this object having this
particular occluded part that is in a certain state. It remains true, on this description, that one’s
experience of the occluded feature causally depends, in an explanatorily significant way, on a state
of affairs that involves this particular occluded fragment of an object. A normal causal explanation
of why the object produced the stimulus that led to the interpolation of certain occluded features
would make reference to the features of the particular occluded fragment of the object.
Another worry might have to do with the mediated character of interpolation. Any contextual
information about the occluded part derives, first and foremost, from information that causally
stems from a visible part. It is in virtue of registering information about visible parts and repre-
senting their distal positions and orientations that one forms an experience of the occluded parts
of the scene. Now, it cannot be a requirement on de re awareness of an item that there be no
causal intermediaries between the item and one’s visual state—if that were the case, then one
could never be aware of distal objects in the world. But the worry is not just that there are causal
intermediaries between the occluded part and one’s experience. It seems that one can only form
an experience of the occluded part of the wire if one is aware of, or represents, its visible parts. To
experience occluded features of the wire, one must at least be in a visual state that represents the
distal positions and orientations of related visible parts. I accept this dependency and will argue
for it in the next section. It is nevertheless unclear why such a dependency would undercut one’s
capacity to also be aware of the occluded part on which the arrangement of visible parts depends.
Put another way: it is unclear why mediate awareness of an item—an awareness which depends
on awareness of some other item—should be impossible. Mediate awareness does not conflict
with the causal requirement outlined above.8
Finally, and relatedly, one might worry that really what is doing the causal work in producing
one’s experience is just the arrangement of visible parts. So long as the visible arrangement is as
shown in Fig. 1a, one will experience a hidden connecting fragment whether or not there really is
one. So how, the worry goes, can the hidden fragment play a causal role in one’s visual state? But
if this is a worry, it is a version of a more general worry that applies to all of perception: when one
holds certain stimulus cues and/or distal conditions fixed, the distal parts of the scene that one
seems to experience no longer display any causal control over one’s experience. Such occasions
give rise to perceptual illusions or mistakes in which one becomes causally disconnected from the
distal entities one seems to experience. I take such occasions to be fully compatible with the claim
that on other normal occasions, distal parts of the world do play a causal role in one’s experiences.
Likewise, the fact that one can have an experience as of an occluded part when none exists does
not entail that occluded parts never play any causal role in the formation of one’s experiences. The
more immediate point, however, is that the causal influence of occluded parts on one’s perceptual
experience is on a par with the causal influence of visible parts of the scene. It is not a distinctive
feature of visual interpolation that it is not always under the causal control of the relevant distal
parts of the scene.
I have defended the claim that our visual experiences of occluded features can, and normally
do, derive from information that systematically depends on particular occluded parts of the scene.
While onemight want to impose further conditions on de re awareness, I am not aware of any that
8 Bermúdez (2000) offers a helpful discussion of these issues. He discusses the ways in which one’s awareness of an item
(a whole object, say) can depend one’s awareness of distinct, though related, items (for example, the facing surface of the
object).
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the experience of visible parts of a scene can meet yet the interpolated experience of occluded
parts cannot. Whatever considerations favor the particularity of our experiences of visible parts
of objects seem also to favor the particularity of our experiences of certain occluded parts. For
example, Dretske (1969) and Siegel (2006) emphasize the importance of differentiating the object
of awareness from its background. I argued in the previous section that our experiences do differ-
entiate occluded parts of the scene from their background. Following Strawson (1959) and Evans
(1982), another commonly proposed requirement is that one be able to “re-identify” the item of
which one is aware or else track it as it moves and changes (Dickie, 2011; Green, 2017). Much
has already been made of the attentional capacity to track whole objects as they move behind
occluders; but we also have visual capacities to track partial fragments of objects as those frag-
ments move, change, and become visible or hidden. Spatiotemporal interpolation occurs when,
for example, one views a firetruck passing behind the obstructing foliage and branches of a tree
(Shipley &Cunningham, 2001; Palmer et al., 2006). Different parts of the truck’s facing surface are
occluded at different times, some never coming into view at all. Experiencing a complete object
behind the tree and experiencing it as the same object through time involves maintaining in per-
ceptual memory visual content about the distal features of particular occluded parts, updating
this content with respect to the objective positions, shapes, colors, and so on of those parts, and
placing that content in correspondence with newly incoming content about those parts. Unlike
the tracking of whole objects, the tracking of occluded fragments is not salient or voluntary. Such
tracking perhaps cannot be characterized as amental action that thewhole individual undertakes.
Nevertheless, even if the tracking is done by sub-individual systems, those systems ensure that the
individual’s experience is fixed to a moveable, changeable part of the scene.
While I have not offered sufficient conditions on being aware of a particular part of a scene, I
hope to havemade it plausible that conditions that are widely thought to be necessary are satisfied
in successful cases of visual interpolation. Occluded parts of a scene have a systematic causal role
in the sorts of visible arrangements that produce the stimulus cues for visual interpolation. Visual
interpolation functions to exploit this causal role.When interpolation is successful, it is successful
because one’s experience of the occluded part of the scene derives from information that causally
depends on that very part of the scene.Moreover, occluded parts are visually distinguished in one’s
experience and the visual system tracks them as they move and change. Interpolation does not
merely function to characterize objects as having some hidden parts with certain features. Inter-
polation functions to characterize the particular hidden parts of the object that are responsible for
the arrangement of the object’s visible parts.
3 SEEING
I have argued that one can experience and be visually aware of particular occluded parts of the
scene. If, however, one does not see occluded parts of a scene, then it follows that one can be
visually aware of—one can have experiences of—particular elements in a scene that one does not
see. To complete the argument, then, it remains to argue that one does not see hidden parts of
the scene. But one possible reaction to the argument so far is to conclude that one can see certain
occluded parts of a scene after all, insofar as these parts of the scene can contribute to one’s visual
experience. Munton (2021) argues that we see invisible objects when we track their movement
behind an occluding surface. Ganson (2020) has likewise defended the claim that we see occluded
parts of objects—that those parts are in some sense visible. In the psychological literature, Kellman
has argued that we should not “confine the meaning of seeing to local sensory responses based on
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local physical data” (Kellman, 2003, p. 922). By contrast, some go so far as to suggest that this
liberalism about what can be seen is conceptually incoherent. For example, Child writes, “If one
has the concept of vision, one knows that 𝑆 will stop seeing something if he shuts his eyes, or if
we interpose something opaque between him and the object” (Child, 1992, p. 311). While I do not
think that the claim that one sees occluded parts of the scene is conceptually incoherent, still the
intuition that one cannot see what is occluded has explanatory value. What our experiences are
of is not confined to what parts of the scene produce “local physical data” at the eye; at the same
time, a narrower concept of seeing, according to which one can only see what produces such local
stimulations, is indispensable for explaining our broader capacity to be visually aware of things.
One’s visual awareness of particular occluded parts of a scene depends asymmetrically on one’s
awareness of the particular visible parts to which they are related. Consider, first, the conditions
for forming representations of occluded features—setting aside the question of which items those
representations are about. The visual system will not represent occluded features at all and those
features will not figure into conscious experience unless the visual system represents the features
of the visible context. Recall that interpolation depends on determining the relatability of the
positions and orientations of distal fragments that do cast light to the eye. The visual systemmust
not only register the light coming from the visible context, but it must form representations of the
positions, orientations, color, texture, and so on of the distal parts that cast that light. Interpolation
does not get off the ground without representing distal features of unoccluded parts of the scene.
Moreover, which particular occluded fragment one is aware of in a scene depends on which
particular visible fragments one is aware of. The occluded part only plays a role in the formation
of one’s interpolated experience if it is responsible for the particular arrangement of distal visible
items that stimulated the formation of that experience. One’s causal-informational relationship to
the occluded part depends on one’s causal-informational relationship to the related context that
produces stimuli at the eye. If one merely hallucinates the unoccluded parts of the wire in the
scene illustrated in Fig. 1a, then one will not be in any position to be aware of the occluded part,
even if such a part exists and even if it has exactly the shape, size, color, and location that one’s
experience indicates. If one’s experience as of visible features does not depend on and is not about
parts that are actually held together by the occluded parts of an object, then the occluded parts
will not play any genuine role in explaining the interpolation of hidden features on that occasion.
Awareness of the visible context is necessary to satisfy the causal requirement for visual awareness
of the occluded part.
While I have argued that one can be visually aware of occluded parts of the scene in virtue
of standing in causal relationships to those occluded parts, seeing an item requires a specific,
more restrictive kind of causal-informational relation. To see an item, one’s awareness of the item
must depend on the registration of local cues from that item itself—for example, patterns of light
reflected by the item or patterns of contrast reflected by the boundary between the item and its
background. There is no reason that this sort of causal relationship to an item should be necessary
in general for awareness of that item. As I have argued, the visual system can exploit other kinds of
epistemically rewarding causal relationships as well. However, one’s ability to be aware of certain
things on the basis of their visible context relies ultimately on one’s seeing the visible context itself.
What one sees is the basis on which one’s awareness of non-visible parts of the world rests.
To be clear, the point here is not that one’s being phenomenally conscious, rather than uncon-
scious, of the occluding elements depends on being phenomenally conscious of the visible ele-
ments. I am not presupposing that visual awareness is necessarily conscious. It is an empirical
question whether one can be consciously aware of an occluded part of the scene if one is only
unconsciously aware of unoccluded parts (cf. Emmanouil & Ro, 2014; Banica & Schwarzkopf,
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2016). The argument here is that one can be in a visual state (conscious or not) that causally
depends on and is about a particular occluded part of the scene only if one is in a visual state
(conscious or not) that causally depends on and is about suitably related unoccluded parts. I do
hold that these visual states are all of types that can be conscious in principle, whether or not they
rise to consciousness on a given occasion.
Munton (2021) argues that one can in fact see occluded objects, as when one tracks an object
as it passes behind an occluder. But such a view cannot dispense with a distinction between the
awareness one has of occluded elements of a scene and the awareness one has of unoccluded
elements. This is evident in Munton’s discussion of how one can have an experience of an object
that has disappeared behind an occluder: “we plausibly need causal contact at some point during
the extended period of time that has priority in determining the content and character of the
moment in question” (Munton, 2021, p. 15). In order to be aware of the object when it is occluded,
one must at some point see the object when it was visible. So, to explain our ability to be aware of
the object while it is occluded, we must appeal to some narrower notion of seeing the object while
it is unoccluded.
Of course, one could alternatively distinguish between a broad sense of “seeing,” in which one
can see an object when it is occluded, and a narrower sense in which one can only see an object
when it is visible. To see an object in the broader sense, one must see (or have seen) some part of
it in the narrower sense. But this is just a terminological difference from the view I am propos-
ing. Whether we call it “visual awareness” or “seeing in a broad sense,” we must distinguish a
more restrictive notion of seeing, without which the broader kind cannot get off the ground. This
narrower notion constitutes an explanatorily significant kind of visual awareness, on which the
broader kind asymmetrically depends. While one can be visually aware of more than what one
sees, one cannot be visually aware of anything unless one sees something.
Seeing an item, in the core sense I have in mind here, requires being aware of it on the basis of
local cues to that item. To be sure, it is challenging to specify exactly what it is to be a local cue to
an item in contrast to a contextual cue. It is not enough to require that a local cue causally depend
on the target item. Contextual cues can causally depend on occluded items. There are difficulties
with requiring that a local cue to an item depend on light reflected from that item, since we can
register local cues to dark, non-reflecting items (see Sorensen, 2008). It cannot be that a cue is
local to an item only if that item is a sufficient cause of the cue, independent of its context. Often,
local cues consist in a pattern of contrast that depends both on the item and its background. It
also cannot be a requirement that each part of the item be involved in producing the local cue.
The light reflected by the facing surface of an object plausibly counts as a local cue to the whole
object. One possibility is that the distinction between local and contextual cues can take different
forms in different causal or explanatory contexts (cf. Phillips, 2015).
It is far from trivial, then, to say what exactly counts as a “local cue,” and hence to specify
the necessary and sufficient conditions on seeing an item, in the narrow sense that I have been
marking out here. In any case, my goal here is not to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
on seeing. The central point is that a distinction must be drawn between a broad capacity to be
visually aware of parts of the scene, including occluded parts, and a narrower capacity to see parts
of the scene that are unoccluded. An adequate explication of what it is to see an item will depend
on some distinction between local and contextual cues to that item, nomatter how the distinction
is ultimately to be precisified. The relation between local and contextual cues explains why visual
awareness of anything depends on seeing something. In order to be aware of something on the
basis of contextual cues, must be aware of the context on the basis of local cues.
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4 FIXING VISUAL REFERENCE
The distinction between visual awareness and seeing has significant consequences for how these
notions are explicated in representational terms. Representational accounts of perception take
perceptual capacities to be constituted by abilities to represent parts of the world and their fea-
tures. A main project of such an account is to explicate notions such as perceiving and seeing
in terms of semantic notions such as reference and accuracy. In line with some previous rep-
resentational accounts of perception, I will treat visual awareness of an item as constituted by
successful visual reference to that item. One way to visually refer to something is on the basis of
local cues to that thing—that is, seeing the item. However, there are other ways to visually refer to
and so be visually aware of items. Successful visual reference to an item is not sufficient for see-
ing that item. Moreover, seeing does not involve a distinctive mode of reference. Seeing a visible
item and being visually aware of a hidden item both involve the same kind of capacity to visually
refer. The primary difference is in how reference is fixed. To put it another way, seeing and visual
awareness do not differ in the semantic requirements that they place on reference-fixing; rather
they differ meta-semantically in the way those requirements happen to be satisfied in a given
instance.9
The account I sketch here builds on elements that can be found in Burge (2010) (see also Sote-
riou, 2000; Recanati, 2012, 2013; Schellenberg, 2018). There are compelling reasons, which I will
not reproduce here, for taking perceptual experiences to have content in virtue of which they rep-
resent the world as being a certain way. An experience is accurate or inaccurate depending on
whether the world is the way the experience represents it. The contents of an experience consti-
tutively depend on the contents of visual information-processing states. One’s visual experiences
and their underlying information-processing states function to have singular de re contents. My
current experience does not just represent something or other as rectangular; the desk in front of
me is such that my visual experience represents it in particular as rectangular. For a token percep-
tual experience to even partially be accurate, there must exist entities such that one’s experience
is about those entities in particular. The contents of experience therefore involve a primitive kind
of reference to objective particulars in the world.
Visual reference is indexical or demonstrative, insofar as the referent of one’s experience
depends on the situation in which the experience occurs (Pylyshyn, 2003; Burge, 2009; Recanati,
2013). Whether my experience is of this tabletop or some other, qualitatively indistinguishable
object, depends on which object is objectively involved in the formation of this very experience.
We can therefore characterize the content of my experience, very roughly, by saying that I experi-
ence the tabletop as that rectangular surface—more generally, that f, for some attribute
𝐹 that I experience the referent as having—rather than as some rectangular surface, say.10
To be visually aware of an item—for one’s experience to be of that item—is for one’s visual experi-
ence to succeed in referring to that item on that occasion, such that the accuracy of the experience
depends on how things are with that item in particular.
One can succeed in being visually aware of, and so visually referring to, particular occluded
parts of a scene. The accuracy of the interpolated aspects of my experience depend on the nature
9 The distinction between “semantics” and “meta-semantics” is adapted here fromKaplan (1989a).Whereas the semantics
of perception is concerned with individuating the representational contents of perceptual states, the meta-semantics of
perception concerns the underlying factors involved in a perceptual state’s having the content that it does.
10 Nothing hinges here onwhether, like Burge, ones takes perception to have a non-propositional attributive content (that
f) or instead propositional predicative content (that is f).
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of the particular occluded parts of the scene that played an objective role (through their influence
on their surrounding context) in causing the interpolation. One’s experience of the scene depicted
in Fig. 1a has as part of its content not just that tilted straight contour on the left and
that tilted straight contour on the right, but also that curved contour in themid-
dle. Successful visual reference to the curved segment is therefore not sufficient for seeing that
segment. To see an item is not just to succeed in visually referring to it, but to do so partly on the
basis of local cues to the item.
Seeing involves one way of fixing visual reference. But does seeing involve a distinctivemode or
character of visual reference? By a representation’s “mode of reference,” I mean the conditions or
requirements that the representation places on successful reference. For example, as a first pass
the word “I” invokes the requirement that the referent be the speaker in the relevant context of
utterance, while “you” invokes the requirement that the referent be the audience in the context
of utterance (Kaplan, 1989b). Different modes of reference correspond to different types of psy-
chological abilities to refer to an item, abilities that function to rely on different kinds of relations
to the world in establishing reference. So, the question is whether there is a mode of visual ref-
erence, a type of psychological ability, that requires that reference be fixed on the basis of local
cues to the referent. The success of this kind of representation would entail that one sees the
referent.
One possibility is that there is a type of visual reference that requires reference to be fixed solely
on the basis of local cues to the referent. Call this “local-only” reference:
(Local-only) A token visual representation with the content, that𝐿 f, refers to an item 𝑥 only
if 𝑥 produced the local stimulations which were the sole basis for tokening the
content, that𝐿 f, on this occasion.11
The problem with this proposal is that vision relies pervasively on contextual cues, both in
determining which features to attribute to a referent and in securing reference to one item as
opposed to another. Even when an object is visible and gives rise to a local feature of the retinal
image, contextual cues regularly “enable the image feature to be assigned to an object” (Albright
& Stoner, 2002, p. 339). Contextual cues play a normal and pervasive role in helping to secure
reference to items that are situated in crowded sceneswithmany opaque and translucent surfaces,
in which some objects are viewed with low resolution in the periphery of one’s vision. Local cues
are noisy; a local cue to one part of a scenemaymix together with a local cue to another part of the
scene. Often, however, the causal sources of a given local stimulation can be distinguished by the
ways in which they are systematically related to other perceivable parts of the scene. Determinate
reference to one causal source often requires jointly referring to these other, related parts of the
scene. The reliance on contextual cues is part of the normal functioning of the visual system.
It would be difficult to isolate any normal course of visual processing that functions to be
immune to the registration of relevant contextual cues. The contents of a visual state or experi-
ence depend on the capacities or abilities that the state or experience exemplifies. If no perceptual
capacity functions to exclude contextual inputs, then there is no basis for attributing to a visual
state a mode of reference that requires reference be fixed solely on the basis of local cues. So,
there are no grounds for postulating a psychological mode of visual reference with a local-only
reference-fixing rule.
11 Note that this only specifies a necessary, not sufficient, condition on fixing reference.
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The argument here is an empirical one: there is no perceptual capacity that functions to rely
solely on local cues to the exclusion of informative contextual cues. A couple of cases may help
to illustrate the way that contextual cues can facilitate the determinate seeing of one item rather
than another. I intend these cases to be illustrations of, rather than arguments for, the role of
contextual cues in seeing. Consider a modification of a case discussed by Anscombe (1974) and
recently taken up by Openshaw & Weksler (2019). Suppose each eye is presented with an image
that arises from a distinct, though qualitatively indiscernible, matchbox. Once the two images are
binocularly fused, arguably it is either indeterminate to which matchbox one’s visual state refers
or perhaps the visual state fails to refer at all.
Now suppose the two matchboxes are visibly attached to popsicle sticks of different colors.
Since the images of the matchboxes correspond perfectly but their surrounding contexts do not,
one would likely experience fusion of the matchboxes but binocular rivalry with respect to the
popsicle sticks. When the percept of one popsicle stick is dominant, so that one is visually aware
of it, one is thereby in a position to be determinately aware of the particular matchbox to which
that stick is attached. It is not even necessary that one accurately perceive the color of the relevant
popsicle stick. So long as one’s perception is of the one stick and not the other, one will be in a
position to be aware of the relatedmatchbox. The visual system relies extensively on structure and
redundancy in scenes in order to disambiguate distal sources of information and represent them
accurately. The matchbox’s attachment to the particular popsicle stick that one experiences can
help to anchor reference to that matchbox as opposed to the other. The matchboxes both produce
local cues, and so in principle can be seen. But which matchbox one determinately sees depends
on contextual cues that arise from related parts of the scene.
As another illustration, suppose you are viewing a thin tinted pane of glass lying on a larger
sheet of white paper. Any local stimulation arising from the part of the paper behind the glass
will also involve local stimulation arising from the intervening pane of glass. However, you can
determinately be aware of the part of the paper behind the glass by registering its relation to the
parts of the paper that are not covered up by the glass. If, however, the glasswere to cover the paper
exactly, it is plausible that the accuracy conditions of your experience would be indeterminate.
There would be no clear fact of the matter about which surface is the standard for evaluating the
accuracy of the experience. If you experience amedium-gray color, is this experience inaccurate of
the white paper or inaccurate of the translucent glass? In general, when a single local stimulation
might arise from a mixture of distinct causal sources, the representation of related parts of the
scene can play a critical role in determinately fixing reference to a particular one of those sources.
What one sees depends not just on the local cues one registers, but also on contextual cues.
Another possibility is that seeing involves a mode of reference that requires at least some local
cues to the referent, although contextual cues may play an additional supporting role. According
to this “local ± contextual” reference-fixing rule:
(Local ± Context) A token visual representation with the content, that𝐿±𝐶 f, refers to an item
𝑥 only if 𝑥 produced local stimulations that were at least partly the basis for
tokening the content, that𝐿±𝐶 f, on this occasion.
This mode of visual reference either picks out something that is visible (that produces local
cues) or else it fails to represent anything at all. As a consequence, one could not visually refer in
this way to a part of the scene whilemaking amistake about whether that part is visible. However,
if one can visually refer to occluded parts at all, as I have argued, then it is conceivable that a visual
experience could mistakenly treat an occluded part of the scene as though it were visible without
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thereby failing to refer to that part. In the “occlusion illusion,” the visible part of a figure that is
perceived as partly occluded appears larger than a physically identical figure that is not perceived
as continuing behind an occluder (Palmer & Schloss, 2017). One explanation of the occlusion
illusion is that “the target is perceived as though it were less occluded than it actually is” (Palmer
& Schloss, 2009, p. 1083).12 According to this explanation, the visual system treats an interpolated
part of the figure as if it were represented on the basis of local cues to that part, even though the
representation in fact draws exclusively on contextual cues.
But while it is illusory to experience an occluded part of an object as if it were a visible part,
there is no reason to think it is necessarily a referential illusion. One can plausibly succeed in
having an experience of part of an object while making a mistake about whether that part of the
object is occluded. We can determinately evaluate whether one’s experience of that part’s color,
shape, size, and position is accurate, even though one misrepresents the part as visible when it is
in fact occluded. The accuracy conditions of an experience may well encode commitments about
the visibility of the represented item. One’s experience might attribute to an item the property of
being in front of another opaque surface or the property of being behind another opaque surface
(Kellman, 2003). This attribution may be accurate or inaccurate. But to suggest that the visibility
of the referent be a requirement on successful referencewould be to rule out, by fiat, the possibility
of perceptual error regarding whether the item one is aware of is occluded or not.
To be sure, alternative explanations of the occlusion illusion are available and there puzzling
features of the illusion that I lack space to discuss. Nevertheless, the availability of the explanation
mentioned here is enough to cast doubt on any view that entails the impossibility of perceptual
error regarding the visibility of a particular item. It is implausible to hold that there is a mode
of reference the success of which precludes any mistake about whether the item is occluded or
not. Given that one can visually refer to both visible and occluded parts of the scene, it would be
surprising if one could not refer to some part of the scene while making a mistake about whether
it is occluded.
I propose that both seeing and interpolation involve the same unified semantic mode of refer-
ence.Without trying to give anything like an exhaustive characterization of thismode of reference,
we can state the relevant requirement as follows:
(Vis Ref) A token visual representation with the content, that f, refers to an item 𝑥 only if the
tokening of the content, that f, depends on 𝑥 in an appropriate way.
One “appropriate” way in which the tokening of visual content can depend on an item is via the
registration of local stimulus cues from that item. But another appropriate way is for the tokening
of the content to depend on the tokening of another content, that g, which refers to some other
item 𝑦 that causally depends on 𝑥. Visual reference to visible items that one sees does not differ
in respect to its semantic requirements from visual reference to occluded items that one does
not see. Seeing and visual awareness do not involve semantically distinct modes of reference or
requirements on reference-fixing; they differ only meta-semantically with respect to the actual
ways in which that requirement is satisfied.
There is a natural analogy here to Quine (1968)’s distinction between “direct” and “deferred”
uses of demonstratives (cf. Bermúdez, 2000). In a direct use of a demonstrative, one intends to
assert a proposition about the object that is demonstrated (for example, the object pointed at). In
12 The occlusion illusion differs from the so-called “boundary extension effect” in which a previously displayed object is
remembered as being less occluded than it actually was (Scherzer & Ekroll, 2015, p. 13).
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a deferred use of a demonstrative, one intends to assert a proposition not about the demonstrated
object, but about some other object related to the demonstratum. I may utter, “That is my favorite
writer,” while pointing to a book, thereby intending to assert of the book’s author that she is my
favorite writer. My arguments above parallel, in a number of respects, Borg (2004)’s arguments
for a uniform semantic treatment of both direct and deferred uses of demonstratives. She denies
that deferred uses of demonstratives disguise definite descriptions, such as the author of that book.
Deferred uses of demonstratives play a singular referring role just as standard direct uses do. Fur-
ther, she argues that there is no distinction in the semantic character or referential requirements
of deferred and direct uses of demonstratives: “it is simply not clear that there is anything like
a class of special, deferred demonstratives which we can isolate from straightforwardly [direct]
demonstratives for a special semantic treatment” (Borg, 2004, p. 179). She concludes, “there are
lots of ways to draw an object to attention to facilitate the use of a referring expression, and point-
ing directly to the object is just one way among others—other ways which include pointing at a
related object” (Borg, 2004, pp. 179–180). Whatever the right story for demonstratives in language,
I suggest that a version of Borg’s point holds for vision. There are lots of ways that a visual state
can come to refer to part of a scene and the registration of local cues from that part is just one
way among others—other ways which include relying on reference to suitably related parts of the
scene.13
One might have lingering doubts that there is any substance to the question of whether seeing
involves a semantically distinctive mode of reference or merely a distinctive way of satisfying
a broader mode of reference. But this question has import both for the accuracy conditions of
experiences and for the broader question of how to individuate mental representational abilities.
As we have seen, a seeing-only mode of reference would preclude the possibility of making a
perceptual mistake about whether a particular part of a scene is occluded or not. My proposal
allows for cases in which one can succeed in visually referring to an item that seems to be visible,
while nevertheless being mistaken about its visibility (whether it is in front of or behind another
surface, say). More fundamentally, the question of whether seeing involves a distinctive mode of
reference bears on how we individuate mental representational abilities. What I am suggesting is
that seeing does not involve the exercise of a distinctive mental ability, separate from the abilities
involved in being aware of occluded parts of the world. Rather, what one sees depends on the
conditions under which the broader ability to visually refer happens to be exercised.
An important consequence of this account is that seeing cannot be explicated fully in terms of
visual reference. There is no mode of visual reference the success of which constitutes seeing. To
qualify as seeing something, onemust not only succeed in visually referring to it, onemust succeed
on the basis of certain extra-representational conditions—that is, conditions that are not them-
selves encoded in the content of one’s perceptual representation. Seeing (and perceiving more
generally) does not reduce to successful visual (or perceptual) reference.
One might be tempted to draw either of the following lessons from the failure fully to expli-
cate perceiving in terms of successful perceptual reference. On the one hand, one might think
that a theory of perceptual representation should be formulated in terms of perceptual reference
or awareness while eschewing notions such as seeing and perceiving, which seem to depend on
factors that are not marked in perceptual representational contents. This is in line with the view,
which I rejected in the previous section, thatwe adopt a liberal notion of seeing or visual awareness
13 Borg is more relaxed about the requirements on demonstrative reference in language than I am about the requirements
on perceptual reference. Perceptual reference requires that one’s perceptual state causally depend, at least in part, on the
referent. Still, this causal dependency on one referent may be mediated by a causal dependency on some other referent.
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without preserving a narrower notion according to which one can see only what is unoccluded.
On the other hand, one might think that a theory of perceiving and seeing can somehow eschew
theories of perceptual representation and reference. Both of these reactions should be resisted.
In the first place, while the notion of seeingmay not figure into a theory of perceptual represen-
tation at the level of specifyingwhat the referential contents of perceptual states are, it does corre-
spond to a fundamental way in which such referential contents get fixed. Unless some instances
of visual reference are fixed in the way that seeing involves, no referential contents are to be had
at all. An account of our perceptual access to particulars must take note of a foundational way in
which perceptual awareness or reference is fixed. On the other end of things, while seeing cannot
be explicated fully in terms of successful visual reference, the account that I have sketched still
explicates seeing in terms of its connection to visual reference. Seeing is visual reference that has
been fixed in a special way (on the basis of local cues). This way of fixing reference is not seman-
tically marked in the referential contents of visual perceptual states. But that is not to say that an
account of visual contents is irrelevant to understanding the nature of seeing.
The concepts of seeing and of visual awareness, or reference, are both indispensable to an
account of how we have perceptual access to particulars in the world, though these concepts
belong to different levels of representational explanation. The proposal here occupies a new posi-
tion in debates about the feasibility of explicating perception in representational terms. If seeing
and perceiving cannot be explicated solely in semantic terms, as kinds of representational success,
they may nevertheless fit within a broader meta-semantic account of the grounds of representa-
tional success.
5 CONCLUSION
I have argued that capacities for perceptual completion enable one to have visual experiences of
particular parts of the world that one cannot see. Psychophysical, neurophysiological, and com-
putational considerations suggest that visual systems encode content specifically about occluded
features of the world. These occluded features can be marked in conscious visual experience. In
representing and experiencing these features, one can be aware de re of particular occluded parts
of the scene. One does not just experience some occluded segment or other as having a certain
shape; one experiences that very occluded part as having a shape. Visual awareness of occluded
parts of the scene is consistent with causal requirements on the objects of visual awareness.
Although one can be visually aware of occluded parts of a scene, I have resisted amove to flatten
the notion of “seeing” so as to encompass experiences of things that are not visible. An account
of how one comes to be aware of occluded parts of the world must admit a strict sense of seeing,
according to which one cannot see what is occluded. This is because the broader capacity to be
visually aware of particulars, whether visible or not, depends asymmetrically on the narrower
capacity to see parts of the scene that are visible.
The distinction between visual awareness and seeing has fundamental consequences for under-
standing how our experiences come to be of particular parts of the world. Seeing an item, unlike
visual awareness of that item, cannot be explained merely as the successful exercise of a repre-
sentational ability to visually refer to that particular item. Seeing does not involve a semantically
distinctive mode of visual reference. To put it yet another way, no type of visual representation
requires that an item be visible in order to be its referent. Still, seeing involves a foundational way
in which visual reference gets fixed. Unless one visually refers to something on the basis of local
cues, one cannot visually refer to anything. One cannot understand the possibility of successful
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perceptual representation without considering the conditions that make seeing (and, more gener-
ally, perceiving) possible. Conversely, a full account of seeing (perceiving) will have to encompass
not just the referential contents of perception but also themeta-semantic conditions under which
perceptual reference is fixed. Seeing and visual reference are integral, though at different levels of
representational explanation, to our perceptual access to particulars in the world.14
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